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Introduction
Generally speaking, overall strategic trends in the Asia-Pacific region have been
positive in many respects. The region’s recovery from the Asian economic crisis has
made visible progress, particularly so in South Korea and Thailand who have taken
initial steps to rebuild prosperous economies in a global competitive environment.
These first steps, however, are part of a longer and deeper socio-economic transfor-
mation which will only succeed when transformation strategies are supplemented by
coherent political reform aiming at the establishment of genuine democracies and
pluralist societies. In this regard, the verdict on the longer-term sustainability of the
present recovery is still open. Moreover, major security conflicts remain unresolved
or have produced new instabilities throughout the entire region since the early
1990s, such as the conflict in the Taiwan Strait. At the same time, the region is
approaching an unprecedented arms race, fueled by new economic growth and an
increasing globalization of security policies, and partly driven by interregional and
global dual-use technology transfers. In contrast with Europe and the Soviet-
American strategic relationship during the Cold War, however, arms control policies
continue to rank low on East Asia’s agenda. Furthermore, the region‘s future
strategic configuration will be determined by the changing norms of the internatio-
nal system, the revolution in military affairs (RMA), preoccupation of the major
powers with their own domestic problems, accelerating trends of democratization
(with implications for foreign policies) and spread of market economies, increasing
intra- and interregional interdependencies (both economic and political), and the
impact of the 1997/98 crisis  on domestic and external security.
2From a European point of view, it is important to recall that armed conflict in the
Taiwan Strait, on the Korean Peninsula or in the South China Sea could have not
only regional but global economic and security implications. Unless carefully
managed, conflicts in those three theatres have the potential to escalate even into
global conflict. Given the complex and rapidly changing nature of East Asia’s
strategic chessboard, crisis and conflict prevention have become urgent requirements
for East Asia. In this context, given the increasing ”globalization of security poli-
cies” and acknowledging that present policies have not translated into real European
influence in the Asia-Pacific region – and have particularly failed to do so at times
of crisis and conflict - Europe and the EU should recognize the imperative to play a
more substantial role. This could include the launching of a strategic dialogue with
China and Taiwan about the consequences of an unprovoked attack or conflict. The
unavoidable globalisation of both economic and security policies compels Europe –
together with the US. and Japan – to shoulder a greater diplomatic and political
burden than it has in the past.
The following analysis provides an overview of recent developments with regard
to the three potential hotspots. The various regional security implications of the
Indonesian crisis and the East Timor independence process are not treated in a
separate section, but they have been taken into account in the last chapter dealing
with the perspectives of a shifting balance of power.
The Korean Peninsula
Strategic trends on the Korean Peninsula and the wider Northeast Asian subregion
remain mixed.1 This chapter first addresses potential security implications of the
unresolved nuclear and missile questions in the framework of the October 1994
Agreed Framework and Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) before
analyzing recent positive developments on the diplomatic front.
The October 1994 Agreed Framework in Crisis
Pyongyang continues to observe the October 1994 Agreed Framework and a
moratorium on missile launches as it negotiates with the US, South Korea and
                                               
1 See also Christopher Dashwood/Kay Möller (eds.), North Korean Scenarios (1993-2003) and
Responses of the European Union (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999) and Ky-
ongsoo Lho/Kay Möller (eds.) Northeast Asia towards 2000: Interdependence and Conflict?
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3Japan. At the same time, however, North Korea has been continuing with missile
development short of test launches (indeed, it has only suspended testing of long-
range ballistic missiles), and has been selling missiles as well as missile technology
to customers around the globe. In the absence of comprehensive inspection proced-
ures, other countries cannot be confident that North Korea has stopped working on
the development of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Its missiles are
capable of striking Japan and the US and inflicting even greater damage on South
Korea. Their development has security implications for South Asia and even for
Europe.2
When North Korea tested its Taepo-Dong-I missile over Japan at the end of Au-
gust 1998 while constructing a suspicious underground site, it threatened the Agreed
Framework and thus the entire KEDO-process, aimed at discouraging nuclear
proliferation on the Korean Peninsula. It is important to note here that the major
source of proliferation threats in East Asia (particularly in Northeast Asia) is not
transfers into the region from the outside, but domestic production lines in China as
well as North Korea and, accordingly, missile and related technology transfers out of
the region into the Gulf, the Middle East, and other potential hotspots around the
world. Furthermore, the emerging secret proliferation network among North Korea,
Pakistan and Iran explains why the former have made such substantial progress in
their missile development and, perhaps, even their nuclear weapons progammes.3
Between 1994 and August 1998, North Korea did not conduct any missile test.
When Pyongyang asked China for testing rights on PRC territory, it received a
negative response. Russian experts, however, believe that the 1994 Agreed Frame-
work notwithstanding, North Korea never completely stopped its missile and nuclear
programmes. In their view, Pyongyang only slowed its R&D programmes while
intensifying its secret development efforts. According to the same sources, North
Korea has drawn two major lessons from India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests:
(1) If even the second most populous country in the world feels it necessary to
choose a nuclear option, then smaller and economically much weaker countries like
North Korea have to rely even more on a nuclear guarantee for their own national
security;
                                               
2 Frank Umbach, „World Gets Wise to P’yongyang’s Nuclear Blackmail – Part One,“ in: Jane’s
Intelligence Review (JIR, September 1999), pp. 33-36, „Part Two,“ ibid. (October 1999), pp.
35-39.
3 For details of these emerging proliferation network see ibid, „Part One“.
4(2) Despite facing economic sanctions and other forms of punishment, India and
Pakistan may ultimately benefit from going nuclear.4
Consequently, Pyongyang hopes to receive yet more concessions by using its
missiles as a tool of nuclear blackmail against the US and the international commu-
nity at a time when at least half of its population has been severely affected by
malnutrition and other life-threatening conditions. Independent estimates of the
number of people who died of starvation and malnutrition-related diseases during
the last three years suggest a minimum of 1-2 million (i.e. almost 10 percent of the
population), whereas North Korea has officially conceded death by starvation of
”just” 220.000 people.5 The disastrous decline of the DPRK’s industrial economy in
the 1990s - GNP reduced by half, infrastructure in a state of near-collapse while
rooted in long-term economic and policy failures – is rooted not only in chronic
shortages of food but also of energy, the production of which has halved since 1990.
Against this background, it is by no means surprising that whereas North Korean
conventional forces have been suffering from a shortage of fuel, spare parts, ammu-
nition, and repair facilities, Pyongyang has tried to modernise its army and airforce
by importing high-tech weaponry paid for through missile exports.6
North Korea’s nuclear and missile blackmail strategies, including refusing to
allow international inspectors full access to its nuclear sites,7 continued missile and
technology exports to Pakistan and Iran,8 the launch of a Taepo-Dong-I on 31
August 1998,9 and revelations of a vast underground facility under construction
which US intelligence sources identified as the site of a reactor or reprocessing
plant10 led to calls for a comprehensive re-evaluation of US policies towards North
Korea.11 Pyongyang‘s policies of blackmail, by undermining the October 1994
Agreed Framework, have one the one hand called into question the KEDO-process
for the freezing of the DPRK‘s plutonium programme. On the other hand, the
                                               
4 „The South Asian Tests and the North Korean Nuclear Programme,“ NAPSNET-Special
Report-DPRK Report, No.12 (March-May 1998).
5 See Jim Hoagland, International Herald Tribune (IHT, 20 August 1998), p. 9; John Pomfret,
ibid. (13-14 February 1999), p. 3, and Johnny Erling, Die Welt (14 March 2000), p. 7.
6 NAPSNET-DPRK Report, No. 17 (March-April 1999), p. 2.
7 See Philip Shenon, IHT (16 July 1998), p. 4, and David E. Sanger, IHT (18 August 1998), pp.
1/4.
8 Pyongyang’s contribution to Pakistan’s and Iran’s missile programmes was demonstrated
during a test of Pakistan’s Ghauri on 6 April 1998 and Iran’s Shahab on 21 July 1998.
9 See Don Kirk, IHT (1 September 1998), pp. 1/4.
10 See Dana Priest, IHT (27 August 1998), p. 4, and Shawn W. Crispin/Shim Jae Hoon, „Broken
Promises,“ Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER, 22 October 1998), pp. 16 f.
11 Peter T.R. Brookes, „High Time to Reevaluate North Korea Policy,“ PacNet Newsletter, No.
38 (2 October 1998).
5Agreed Framework can also be viewed as the centerpiece of a broader diplomatic
effort made by the US and the international community ”to integrate the PPRK into
the world community and restrain its ‘rogue’ behavior through systematic engage-
ment.”12
In early 1998, North Korea warned Washington that it would abandon the Agreed
Framework if the US failed to implement its part of the deal, namely the timely
shipping of heavy fuel to the DPRK. Following intensive discussions with Wa-
shington and Seoul, Tokyo in October 1998 stopped withholding the US$ 1 billion it
had earlier pledged to KEDO for the construction of two light-water reactors in
North Korea.13 But no short-term solution is in sight for either the nuclear program-
me or the missile problem. So far, the Agreed Framework has only stopped the
production of plutonium at the Yongbyon Atomic Energy Research Centre. Whether
this means halting or severely curtailing North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme
has become increasingly questionable. Discovery in 1998 of a secret underground
facility,  presumably to be used for nuclear purposes in violation of the 1994
agreement, by US intelligence satellites once again raised international concerns that
Pyongyang was hiding an active and advancing nuclear weapons programme.
Furthermore, acknowledgement that the Agreed Framework cannot stop North
Korea’s ballistic missile programmes has aggravated the crisis since 1998. At the
same time, Beijing’s ambassador to Seoul repeatedly supported North Korea’s
position by claiming that US demands for access to the underground site were
merely based on suspicion and went far beyond international norms. And whereas
Washington spoke of ”compelling evidence” and concerns that North Korea was in
violation of the Agreed Framework, from the ambassador’s point of view, Pyong-
yang‘s missile development programme had already existed for a long time and was
irrelevant to the agreement.14 In the US perception it has become clear that its
engagement policy has not modified North Korea’s overall behavior.
Thus far, the Agreed Framework seems to have failed opening North Korea’s
society to the outside world and constraining Pyongyang‘s ruthless behaviour.
According to its critics, it has done no more than provide a framework for moving
from one crisis to the next without revealing any light at the end of the tunnel.
Doubtless, frequent crises have weakened the agreement’s credibilty and support,
                                               
12 Wade Huntley/Timothy L. Savage, „Agreed Framework at the Crossroads,“ NAPSNet Special
Report (11 March 1999).
13 See IHT (17-18 October 1998), p. 7.
14 „No Country has Such a Right,“ in: Newsreview (South Korea, 16 January 1999), p. 8. The
Chinese ambassador also defended North Korea’s right to launch missiles for ‚scientific purpo-
ses‘ – see John Burton, Financial Times (FT, 23 July 1999), p. 4.
6particularly in the US Congress. Against this background, the so-called ”benign
neglect option” which suggests cutting off all contacts with North Korea, keeping all
sanctions in place, and focusing on maximizing US deterrence capabilities has
gained increasing support.15 However, such a change of US policies vis-à-vis the
DPRK would undermine South Korea’s ”sunshine policy” and thus risk impairing
the US-South Korea alliance. Therefore, the Clinton administration, while maintai-
ning its present engagement effort vis-à-vis North Korea, has said it would exchange
carrots (including the easing of US trade sanctions, provision of food and develop-
ment aid, and opening of liaison offices) for sticks if attempts to curb the DPRK’s
missile and nuclear programmes failed.16
Given that North Korea views its missile capability as its last trump card when
trying to entice Washington into negotiations over the withdrawal of US forces from
South Korea, future prospects of the Agreed Framework at first glance appear to be
rather poor. Furthermore, the DPRK is believed to have produced sufficient plutoni-
um to construct 2-6 bombs.17 With continued submarine and special forces incursi-
ons into the South, ongoing tunneling under the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and
preparations for new missile tests under way since late 1998,18 the present situation
on the Korean peninsula seems just as tense as it was before the signing of the
Agreed Framework.
Against this background, a growing number of US experts and politicians called
for a fundamental diplomatic review in a broader context of arms control measures
to be applied to the Korean peninsula.19 Even those experts who still favoured
continuing with, rather than abandoning the Agreed Framework, argued in favour of
a ”new deal” incorporating ”new issues of concern by supplementing it (the Agreed
Framework) with new and  more comprehensive commitments” because it could
otherwise be impossible to save it.20 What is indeed lacking in US policies towards
North Korea is a comprehensive, long-term strategy that creates a common frame-
work for Agreed Framework/KEDO issues, US-DPRK missile talks, and related
initiatives.21 South Korea’s President Kim Dae-jung has proposed a so-called
                                               
15 Huntley/Savage, „Agreed Framework in Crisis“.
16 See IHT (11 March 1999), p. 4.
17 See David E. Sanger, IHT (18 August 1998), pp. 1 and 4, here p. 4.
18 See Lee Sung-yul, The Korea Herald (TKH, 24 November 1998), p. 1; ibid (3 December
1998), p. 5; ibid. (4 December 1998), p. 1; ibid. (5 December 1998), p. 2, and Greg Seigle, „A-
nother N.Korean Missile Launch Near, Says USA,“ Jane’s Defence Weekly (JDW, 9 December
1998), p. 4.
19 Larry Niksch, „North Korea’s Coming ICBM,“ PacNet Newsletter, No. 5 (5 February 1999).
20 Huntley/Savage, „Agreed Framework in Crisis“.
21 Ralph A. Cossa, „South Korea’s Package Deal,“ PacNet Newsletter, No. 10 (12 March 1999).
7”package deal”, linking controversial issues of the Agreed Framework/KEDO with
food and economic aid and an end to the US embargo.
North Korea has not participated in meaningful missile proliferation talks for
more than two years and in the meantime has become the world’s largest supplier of
ballistic missiles and related technology – primarily to Pakistan, Iran, and Syria.
Because missile exports have been one of the few means for the DPRK to obtain
hard currency, Pyongyang has shown some willingness to trade its missile pro-
gramme for a price. Shortly after the August 1998 missile test, North Korea an-
nounced its intention to export the Taepo-dong-I from 2000 onwards at US$ 6
million per piece.22 Simultaneously, it demanded US$ 500 million from Washington
in compensation for stopping missile exports to the Middle East.23 On 16 June 1998,
Pyongyang even appeared willing to negotiate an end to all missile tests and
deployments, which would have significantly enhanced Japan’s security, stabilized
the KEDO-process, and contributed to global non-proliferation efforts. Whereas this
offer was not followed up, parallel demands for a US$ 300 million payment in
exchange for permission to allow a one-time on-the spot inspection of the vast
underground facility under construction in Kumchang-ri, some 40 kms northwest of
Yongbyon, North Korea’s main nuclear complex, were turned down by the US.24
According to South Korean sources of December 1998, North Korea has moved 180
armament factories underground.25
While North Korea’s missile exports and transfers of missile technology so far
have not had direct security implications for Japan, its missile test of August 1998
fundamentally changed Japan’s short-term security perceptions and defence policies
with implications for the US-Japan alliance and the relationship between Japan and
China.
After the launch, Washington agreed to provide 500,000 tons of food aid in addi-
tion to the 300,000 tons it had already committed through the World Food Pro-
gramme (WFP). However, the Clinton administration insisted that the 800,000 tons
was not a compensation for access to the suspected nuclear site,26 as such an inter-
pretation would have encouraged Pyongyang’s policies of blackmail even further.
On the positive side KEDO’s financial troubles have begun to dissipate. In early
1998, the US Congress had withheld the approval for US$ 15 million to fund the
                                               
22 See Don Kirk, IHT (3 September 1998), p. 4.
23 See TKH (3 September 1998), p. 3.
24 See Jun Kwan-woo, TKH (20 November 1998), p. 1.
25 See JDW (23 December 1998), p. 16.
26 See „Aid for Access?“’ in: Newsreview (13 February 1999), p. 5.
8supply of heavy fuel, because North Korea was not fully cooperating on the inspec-
tions issue.
The March 1999 agreement between North Korea and the US to allow American
experts to inspect the suspected nuclear underground facility at Kumchang-ri eased
fears of an imminent security crisis in Northeast Asia. At the same time, Washington
pledged another 100,000 tonnes in food aid.27 Although the State Department
initially insisted that this was by no means a quid pro quo, it transpired later that
Washington had indeed agreed to pay a ”fee” for inspecting the underground
facility. Unsurprisingly, the new ”food for access” agreement, also described as
”potato diplomacy”, could not satisfy critical voices in the Congress which had
dismissed Clinton‘s engagement policy towards North Korea as ”appeasement”.
According to these critics, the new agreement could only harden Pyongyang’s
policies of blackmail towards the US, South Korea, and Japan. ”Bad behaviour will
continue be rewarded,” as James Baker III, the Republican presidential candidate,
argued shortly after the agreement had been concluded. Indeed, many aspects
remained controversial. While US officials were talking about ”inspecting” the
underground facility, North Korea said that American inspectors would just ”visit”
the site. Furthermore, as more than six months had passed since suspicions over the
site had first emerged, North Korea had had sufficient time to clear the facility and
to move its suspected nuclear weapons programme to another underground site not
covered by the agreement.28 Therefore, it would be unrealistic to assert that the
agreement has halted North Korea’s ”brinkmanship game”, thus opening the way for
a political rapprochement between North Korea, the US, and the rest of the interna-
tional community. Moreover, the agreement can only be part of a broader package
deal that would also solve other outstanding issues such as North Korea’s missile
tests and missile exports. Consequently, Pyongyang remains the ”wild card” as far
as a normalization of relations and easing of international sanctions are concerned,
and recent revelations about DPRK state-sponsored drug trafficking would seem to
confirm this assumption.29
Although the May 1999 Kumchang-ri30 inspection by fifteen US experts under
the direction of former secretary of defence Dr. William Perry did not produce
                                               
27 See also John Burton, FT (18 March 1999), p. 7, and „Hope for the Future,“ Newsreview (20
March 1999), p. 5.
28 Shawn W. Crispin/Shim Jae Hoon, „Buying Time,“ FEER (1 April 1999), pp. 18-20.
29 See also Douglas Farah/Thomas Lippman, IHT (27-28 March 1999), p. 6.
30 On Kumchang-ri and other nuclear facilities in North Korea see in particular Joseph S.
Bermudez Jr., „Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure – Part One,“ JIR (July
1999), pp. 36-41; „Part Two,“ ibid. (August 1999).
9evidence for the previous or intended production of weapons-grade plutonium or
reprocessing activities,31 the site could support the respective facilities in the future
if substantially modified. Moreover, a considerable part of North Korea’s earlier
nuclear programme and many nuclear facilities have remained unmonitored since
the signing of the Agreed Framework in October 1994. Therefore, a follow-up visit
to Kumchang-ri, scheduled for May 2000, will not allow any definite conclusions
either.
Following the June 1999 naval clash between South and North Korean vessels in
the Yellow Sea, during which South Korea sunk at least one North Korean ship32,
observers expected the launch of another long-range Taepo-Dong 2 ballistic missile
to serve as a ”force multiplier” marking the 51st anniversary of the Communist
government on September 9, 1999. From Pyongyang’s point of view, the test would
have demonstrated the DPRK’s determination and capability to offset South Korea’s
increasing lead in conventional military technologies. Furthermore, North Korea
was building an underground missile base – from which Taepo-Dong-1 and –2s
could be fired – in the mountainous area of Youngjeo-dong, just 20 kms from its
border with China, a site that had probably been chosen to avoid pre-emptive strikes
by US cruise missiles.33 In sum, North Korea seems unwilling and unable to bargain
away its only remaining trump card, namely, its ballistic missiles. Ultimately,
missile development cannot be divorced from the goal of sustaining the DPRK’s
political system and regime. Therefore, US and Western comprehensive engagement
strategies can hardly succeed – whether they assume the guise of the 1994 Agreed
Framework or that of any other attempt at conditioning.
New Opportunities and Challenges Ahead
Even under the best of circumstances, future diplomacy vis-à-vis North Korea will
probably remain tense and frustrating. On the other hand, there is no viable political
alternative if one seeks to avoid a return to the disastrous preemptive military
options the US was considering in 1994 to stop North Korea’s nuclear programme.
Implementing the Agreed Framework remains the best gamble for preventing
                                               
31 The team was permitted to measure all underground areas and to take soil and water samples.
32 At least 30 North Koreans were killed, one DPRK topedo boat was sunk, and four others were
damaged. On the other side, five South Korean patrol ships were damaged, and nine sailors
were injured. See Mark J. Valencia/Jenny Miller Garmendia, IHT (17 December 1999), p. 10;
John Burton/Stephen Fidler, FT (16 June 1999), p. 1 and Trevor Hollingsbee, „Koreans Clash
in the Yellow Sea,“ in: JIR (July 1999), p. 2.
33 See IHT (8 July 1999), p. 6.
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nuclear weapons development in the DPRK. At the same time, North Korea is
increasingly dependent on outside support to sustain itself which provides at least
some incentives for more dialogue. However, a second Taepo-Dong missile launch
would call into question all current attempts to engage Pyongyang, which is why the
issue can be viewed as a litmus test for the DPRK’s intention to either cooperate
with or to confront the outside world.
The KEDO experience has stressed the importance of demanding strict recipro-
city and standing firm with Pyongyang. Provocative North Korean behaviour should
not go unanswered, and the DPRK should be in no doubt as to the consequences its
actions will produce. And yet, even under a Republican administration, US policy is
unlikely to experience radical change in substance, except, perhaps, for a more
consequential military stance along the DMZ. Any rapid and uncoordinated US
policy shift away from the May 1999 Perry Report and Kim Dae-jung’s ”sunshine
diplomacy” to a more confrontational posture would not only undermine Kim’s
standing in his own country but also confuse Japanese efforts and the support that
engagement has enjoyed among Korea’s neighbours. However, even in the absence
of rapid strategic change, KEDO has been facing a number of unresolved problems,
namely:
(1) KEDO needs an agreement on nuclear liability for the LWR project with the
prime contractor, KEPCO, that is acceptable to the subcontractors;
(2) it needs an agreed-upon delivery schedule that sets out a time-frame for const-
ruction of the two LWR plants and that contains obligations North Korea must meet
for the project to be completed;
(3) there has been disagreement on how to handle the timing of Pyongyang’s
coming into full compliance with IAEA safeguard obligations (the IAEA‘s investi-
gative and analytical process may take as long as 24 months during which time little
or no work could be done at the Kumbo construction site, which in turn would
significantly raise costs).34 In this context, it should be recalled that North Korea has
pledged to reveal its nuclear past and to disclose how much weapons-grade plutoni-
um it has separated only after KEDO has completed a ”significant portion” of the
two LWRs.
North Korea’s recent interest in economics and business has been underscored by
an increase in late 1998 and early 1999 in the numbers of DPRK diplomats posted
                                               
34 See the testimony of Mitchell B. Reiss before the Committee on International Relations, US
House of Representatives, Washington, 16 March 2000, as quoted in NAPSNET Special Report
(22 March 2000).
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overseas, particularly to Europe after a 30 percent reduction witnessed throughout
1998. It remains to be seen whether Pyongyang’s new diplomatic activism35 will
have lasting positive implications for security in North East Asia. Pyongyang’s main
interest is in foreign aid and investment, but the abovementioned activities could
also reflect a steady increase in self-confidence within the North Korean regime as
the country’s protracted famine shows signs of some easing.36 Moreover, bilateral
trade with South Korea reached a record US$ 330 million in 1999, up from US$ 220
million in 1998.37 At the same time, inter-Korean social, cultural, and personnel
exchanges have increased remarkably. By the end of 1999, 581 South Korean
companies were doing business in North Korea, and more than 20,000 South
Koreans had visited the North since February 1998.
At the same time, Beijing wants to extend its influence on the Korean peninsula
so as to become a prime regional player. China is fully aware of the negative
implications of another DPRK missile launch, particularly with regard to Tokyo’s
changing defence policies and the joint US-Japanese TMD project. In several
respects, the PRC had appeared to be the ”big loser” in the regional fallout from
North Korea’s 1998 missile test. It hurt China’s strategic interests by bolstering
support in the region for an increased US military presence and continuation of the
US-Japan alliance. Though China retains more influence over North Korea than any
other country in the world, PRC-DPRK relations had become tense by mid-1999 due
to a number of bilateral controversies.38 Some US experts have interpreted Beijing’s
recent attempt to increase cooperation and coordination with North Korea as
synchronized action to exert pressure against Taiwan and South Korea.39 A parallel
escalation of both conflicts would divide US attention, resources and rapid reaction
capabilities as well as aggravating Washington‘s greatest concern – having to fight
                                               
35 Italy was the first G-7 member to establish diplomatic relations in January 2000. Canada and
Japan have been holding talks on a normalization of relations. The Philippines have said they
would establish official relations and explore possibilities to bring the DPRK closer to ASEAN.
Australia has entered into discussions on the re-establishment of ties. Kim Jung-il, in an unusu-
al gesture, visited the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang in March 2000. Russia signed a new
friendship treaty on 9 February 2000 and has been trying to increase its influence on the Ko-
rean peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region by maintaining a balanced relationship with
both Koreas. Unlike the 1961 mutual defence pact, in which Moscow had pledged to fight a-
longside its ally in case of war, the new treaty contains no such mutual defence automatism.
Pyongyang has moderated its traditional hostility towards Washington and Seoul.
36 See also Shim Jae Hoon, „Signs of a Thaw,“ in: FEER (10 February 2000), p. 24; Lorien
Holland, „Hello, World,“ FEER (23 March 2000), p. 24, and Howard W. French, IHT (18-19
March 2000), pp. 1/5.
37 See ‘Kim Sticks with Sunshine Policy‘, in: Korea Now (29 January 2000), pp. 5f. (6).
38 See also Lorien Holland, „Lips and Teeth,“ FEER (29 April 1999), p. 15.
39 See „China and North Korea Coordinate,“ Stratfor.com Global Intelligence Update (7 March
2000; Internet: www.stratfor.com/).
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two simultaneous high-intensity conflicts, something for which the US is not
sufficiently prepared.40
As of today, any breakthrough in the inter-Korean dialogue has been prevented
by North Korea’s insistence on certain conditions, such as the withdrawal of US
troops from the Korean peninsula and an end of joint military cooperation among
South Korea, the US, and Japan. And yet, Pyongyang has recently warmed to the
idea of high-level inter-Korean talks. Ultimately, the DPRK leadership will pursue
various strategies to assure the interim survival of the political regime and will shift
back and forth among them as it sees fit. Therefore, and recent positive trends on the
Korean peninsula notwithstanding, North Korea’s gradual inclusion into the interna-
tional community is by no means assured, and the issue requires a constant and
coherent international crisis management and multilateral engagement. Pyongyang‘s
unilateral attempt to push the maritime border south, for instance, can provoke
unintended military clashes with South Korea as has happened several times during
recent years. As has been explained by Kim Dae-jung, North Korea basically has
three options to choose from: (1) war (would end disastrously for the North Korean
regime), (2) the status quo (already proven to be a dead end), and (3) evolutionary
change (following, in principle, the examples of Vietnam and China).41 During the
1990s, the balance of power on the peninsula has decisively shifted in South Korea’s
favour with Noth Korea’s economy hovering on the brink of collapse. Since 1996,
US$ 400-500 million worth of international aid has been flowing into North Korea
annually,42 and the DPRK has become the number one recipient of US economic aid
in Asia. With the weakening of North Korea’s former relative strength, Pyongyang’s
sense of insecurity has been getting stronger. Under such circumstances, North
Korea has sought to develop nuclear and missile capabilities to guarantee its military
and political survival and may yet try to speed up its missile development to enhance
its deterrent capability – particularly after having experienced NATO’s intervention
in Kosovo. At the same time, a political collapse of the Pyongyang regime for the
time being remains rather unlikely.
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Against this wider background, speculating about a possible US pullout following
reunifications would not only be premature but would send the wrong signal at the
wrong time. However, Seoul is in a difficult position. On the one hand, South Korea
must rely on American forces to deter potential North Korean attacks. On the other
hand, these forces‘ very presence could increase the likelihood of conflict, and,
simultaneously, undermine or at least compromise the successes of ”sunshine
diplomacy” – a strategy of constructive engagement and gradual peaceful reunifica-
tion with North Korea through the promotion of peace, reconciliation, and coopera-
tion. Therefore, incremental South Korean shifts away from dependence on the US
remains possible, particularly with China pressuring Washington by playing the
”North Korean Card”. A complete US troop withdrawal, however, would not only
have important security implications for the Korean peninsula, but for Northeast
Asia as a whole. As a consequence, discussions such as the one recently stimulated
by the South Korean Defence Ministry with a view to justifying higher defence
budgets are in many respects counterproductive and short-sighted (in this context,
unified Germany can be viewed as a positive example for a troop reduction short of
a complete US withdrawal).
Escalating Conflict in the Taiwan Strait?
Recently increased tension between China and Taiwan in the runup to Taiwan’s 18
March 2000 presidential elections have once again emphasized one of the region’s
major security risks.43 Contrasting with its response to the 1996 presidential electi-
ons, however, Beijing this time chose to use words to impress Taiwanese candidates
and voters rather than missile tests and large-scale manoeuvres in the waters sur-
rounding the island republic. This change of mind could be explained by the fact
that Beijing needs US congressional approval to go ahead with its WTO accession.
But differing statements from the PRC foreign ministry, political circles, and the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might be explained in two different ways: First,
they could indicate a lack of clear leadership at the top of President Jiang Zemin’s
administration, leaving policy on the sentive Taiwan issue to be settled among
hawks and doves. In this case, the doves would have prevailed, because rhetorics
notwithstanding, Beijing policies have been mostly reactive. Secondly, differing
statements made prior to the Taiwanese elections could reflect a division of labour
rather than a division of views. However, the PLA was not alone in playing the ”bad
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guy”. Even Prime Minister Zhu Rongji came across as a hardliner when declaring
that the Chinese nation was ready to ”use all its blood” to prevent the island’s
independence.44 To adequately analyse these developments, one would probably
have to combine both explanations. Moreover, Beijing’s general hardline policy vis-
à-vis Taiwan is at least partially an attempt to divert popular attention away from
growing domestic problems45 and to channel an assertive and xenophobic variety of
nationalism.
China’s ”White Paper”on Taiwan, issued on February 21, 2000,46 and thus meant
to intimidate Taiwanese voters, was also confusing for foreign observers but could
be interpreted as a compromise between hardline and softline factions. On the one
hand, the paper sent a clear message: China would attack Taiwan (1) if the island
declared independence, (2) if  it was occupied by a foreign power or, (3) establishing
a new linkage, if Taiwan indefinitely refused to enter into negotiations on reunifica-
tion. On the other hand, however, Beijing appeared to agree to one of Taipei’s main
conditions for political talks with China, namely, that the island be treated as an
equal and not as a ”local government”. The White Paper mentions this principle of
equality no less than five times. Overall, however, the policy paper would appear to
signal an increasing PRC impatience. Moreover, as James A. Kelly, president of the
Pacific Forum CSIS, has argued: ”On balance, the policy paper is more about threats
and lowering the threshold at which violence might occur than about motivating
Taiwan.”47 Indeed, President Jiang Zemin has repeatedly said that he intends to
make reunification of the motherland his own legacy. From such a perspective, a
resolution of the Taiwan issue would have to be brought about by the time the 17th
Communist Party Congress convenes in 2007, when Jiang Zemin will be 81 and
retire from the political scene.48
At the same time, the PLA – that has already acquired unprecedented capacity for
influencing the policy-making process49 and which could be the biggest winner from
increased tension with Taipei50 – has been asked to ”actively prepare” for war with
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Taiwan. In an internal document sent by CPC‘s Central Military Commission to all
regional commanders, Beijing warns of an ”increased possibility for a military
solution”, should nonviolent means fail to accelerate the absorbation of Taiwan. The
document envisions a blitzkrieg-like offensive opened with a first fatal missile strike
so that ”the Taiwan forces have no way to organize effective resistance.” From
Beijing and the PLA’s points of view, any backlashes on this issue, such as the
proclamation in July 1999 by Taiwan’s (former) President Lee Teng-hui’s of a ”two-
countries theory” fuels mainland China’s disintegration by encouraging independen-
ce for Tibet, Xinjiang and other occupied areas. The White Paper also mentions that
it is very unlikely that European countries would come to Taiwan’s rescue, but
anticipates a US intervention to defend the island against an attack. Interestingly, the
document is completely in line with the PLA’s interest in ”asymmetric strategies” of
warfare to be used vis-à-vis the US. The PLA believes, for example, that such a
conflict will not escalate into a nuclear missile exchange, because the US will lose
its will to fight and withdraw after suffering serious casualties, while the Chinese
side will be able to absorb heavy casualties and prevail.51 Therefore, China does not
require a military equilibrium with the US.
Although Beijing and Taipei have engaged in a series of damage control mea-
sures since the stunning victory (with a voter turnout of 82 percent) of the pro-
independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan’s presidential electi-
ons, the victory of Chen Shuibian and the DPP in many respects marks a watershed
in 5,000 years of Chinese and 400 years of Taiwanese history. By breaking from the
Kuomintang’s half century of power, the island made its thirteen-year democratiza-
tion process irreversible. For Beijing, this development only heightens concerns that
Taiwan has been drifting ever further away from the mainland, and is headed
towards formal independence. In a good-will gesture, President-Elect Chen Shui-
bian ended a 51-year old ban on direct trade, transport and postal links between
several small islands (Kinmen, Penghu and Matsu) and the mainland and eased
restrictions on foreign investors in Taiwan, including from China. Given the fact that
the abovementioned islands lack substantial infrastructure and industry, the abolition
of the ban on direct links is just a first step toward establishing such links across the
Taiwan Strait.52 These advances were also partly motivated by domestic considerati-
ons. Chen won with just 39 percent of the vote and therefore has no majority support
in the parliament. The new government will need a few foreign policy successes to
be able to resolutely fight the endemic corruption left by the Kuomintang, to fairly
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allocate central-government funding, and to break the links between organized crime
and politics that have haunted the island for decades. These domestic priorities can
hardly be ignored by Beijing: the new president and his government have but limited
leeway for dealing with cross-Strait issues because they are confronted with more
urgent priorities and problems to be solved at home.
While Beijing remained remarkably silent immediately after the Taiwanese elec-
tions, a PLA source threatened Taiwan with a two-million-soldier invasion force
carried on 200,000 fishing boats, while adding that nuclear weapons were a viable
option, particularly so if the US interfered.53 The PRC‘s supposed interest to return
to a more moderate policy can be explained by the fact that its failure to threaten
Taiwan into submission may have undermined the CPC’s domestic legitimacy.
Furthermore, China has benefited considerably from business links with Taiwan.
More than 60,000 Taiwanese companies have been actively engaged on the main-
land and have invested some US$ 44 billion there. Taiwan has thus become the third
most important investor for Beijing, and China the second-largest market for
Taiwan‘s exports. Two-way trade rose to a record US$ 25,8 billion last year, up 14.5
percent from 1998. Indirect trade between both sides totals US$ 160 billion. 200,000
Taiwanese citizens live in mainland China, and another 16 million have traveled
there since 1987.54 To some extent, this growing economic interdependence
confronts both sides with a dilemma as it affects and possibly constrains their
respective political options. The dilemma is asymmetric, however, in that it prima-
rily affects the weaker side, i.e. Taiwan. The island‘s leaders need to debate a
solution to this and other problems before serious negotiations can lead to a new
understanding on both sides of the Taiwan Strait that would contribute to security
and stability in the 21st century.
If present strategic trends continue, however, the military balance in the Taiwan
Strait will be eroding over the next decade.55 In recent years, the PLA has revised its
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strategy for a Taiwan contingency.56 It now hopes to achieve its objectives without
fighting a war, by wreaking economic havoc and instigating social unrest in Taiwan.
Hence, ”weapons” that target the Taiwanese media, the stockmarket, and the
islanders’ psyche, have become an important part of China’s military thinking on
Taiwan. However, and depending on the island’s own policies and actions, gradual
escalation strategies might still involve missile tests, a sea blockade, combined-force
drills, and a military buildup. Such strategies of attrition, based on a ”war of
nerves”designed to undermine the morale of the Taiwan population, could provide
the PLA with the best chances to succeed in a major conflict while at the same time
preventing a US intervention.57 Whether these new strategies will succeed depends
on many variables. But one outcome appears to be assured: ”Next time, nerves in
Taiwan may be more steeled.”58 Moreover, the 1995/96 missile tests had been quite
successful. They escaped Taiwan’s early warning and detection radars59 and were
much more accurate than American experts had previously expected.60 They unders-
cored both the progress the PLA had made in modernizing its missile force and
specific military shortcomings on the Taiwanese side which was unable to detect the
missiles and thus could not have destroyed them. The US remains the lone regional
player with sufficient signal intelligence (SIGINT) capability to detect PRC missiles
in ”real time”. Furthermore, the July 1995 and March 1996 missile tests were
conducted in conjunction with broad multiservice exercises, in which tactical
ballistic missiles are going to play an increasingly important role in the future.61 It
was one of the major lessons of the crisis ”that the PLA can challenge Taiwan’s vital
interests without direct engagement.”62 Unsurprisingly, the PLA has also drawn its
more painful lessons and will try to fare better next time.
Taiwan’s impressive military modernization programmes of the 1990s
notwithstanding, one may ask whether the island‘s armed forces will be able to
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effectively use latest additions to their weaponry, given a lack of force multipliers
and adequate military training, low morale, and operational as well as doctrinal
shortcomings in both strategy and tactics. Furthermore, the last time that Taiwan’s
armed forces conducted joint military exercises together with the US was 20 years
ago. The extent of intra-operability – technical, doctrinal, as well as operational –
and experiences made with joint military operations therefore remains rather limited.
While the PLA currently lacks a credible invasion force and will continue to do
so until at least 2005, China has been rapidly increasing its short-range ballistic
missile force in numbers as well as in quality.63 At the moment, the PRC is deploy-
ing an advanced, longer-range version of the DF-21, provisionally called DF-21X,
with an extended range of 3,000 kms and an improved accuracy.64 Moreover,
Beijing plans to launch six satellites before the end of the year which will improve
the accuracy of its ballistic missiles and will allow detailed reconnaissance of
Taiwan’s defence capabilities. At the same time, the PLA has made considerable
progress in developing manoeuvrable short-range ballistic missiles with ranges
between 300 and 600 kms and has been developing a new generation of land attack
cruise missiles to accurately target key Taiwanese military installations with the help
of newly acquired dual-use technologies such as the Global Positioning System
(GPS) and the Inertial Navigation Guidance System (INS).65 These dual-use tech-
nologies are widely available on the civilian market. In 1999, China deployed 150-
200 M-11 (range 300 kms) and M-9 (range 600 kms) short-range ballistic missiles in
addition to 30-50 SRBMs deployed in 1995-96 in provinces adjacent to the 175-km-
wide Taiwan Strait – most of them presumably with improved accuracy estimated to
be 20-30 metres by using GPS and INS minicomputers which are widely available
on the civilian market. Beijing reportedly plans to further increase that number to
650-800 missiles by the year 2005.66 This rearmament is at least partially due to the
fact that the PLA – in contrast with China’s Foreign Ministry and other civilian
ministries – continues to view the controversial missile tests of 1995 and 1996 as a
political victory.67 In a few years’ time, the Chinese missile build-up could shift the
balance of deterrence in favour of mainland China and prompt Beijing to adopt more
risky policies vis-à-vis Taiwan. In response to the missile threat, Taipei will deploy
three Patriot batteries in northern Taiwan to protect the capital city and economic
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centre. However, the former present no watertight shield against every incoming
missile.68 Taiwan is therefore no longer interested in ballistic missile defence alone,
but intends to develop and deploy its own offensive ballistic missiles (such as the
Tien-Ma with a range of 1,000 kms).69 Taipei’s current modernization and procure-
ment efforts can be explained by the wish to buy time for the democratization on
mainland China rather than maintaining a military balance.
While reunification with Taiwan remains Beijing’s number one political priority,
any unprovoked missile attack or invasion of Taiwan would likely produce regional
and global instabilities by provoking (1) increased US military supplies to Taiwan or
a US military intervention, (2) Taiwan’s rejection of reunification and declaration of
independence, (3) Japan’s rearming and tightening of the US-Japan alliance, and (4)
China’s own economic and political isolation from the global economy and Western
sources of investment.
Thus far, Washington sticks to the political bargain struck with China in 1972:
the US will maintain a ”One-China”-policy for as long as Beijing desists from
solving the Taiwan problem by other than peaceful means. It remains to be seen
whether Beijing and Taipei will be able and willing to adhere to the inherent prin-
ciples. The foreign policy implications of Taiwan’s remarkable democratization
process as of today are quite different from the situation when China and the US
agreed on their Shanghai compromise. Presently, nobody can be sure whether all
involved governments will ultimately be able to follow and to adapt to the new
political realities or whether the new realities will have to adapt to ”the old 1972
understanding” between Washington and Beijing. Given the changing political
environment in the region, the present situation can be viewed to some extent as
being ”unnatural”. Both the US’s and China’s credibility are very much at stake with
regard to Taiwan. Whereas Beijing has not rejected the original understanding, it has
put greater emphasis on the coercive aspect of diplomacy and has simultaneously
deepened the classic security dilemma by increasing its military arsenal vis-à-
Taiwan in both qualitative and quantitative terms. The present situation will not and
cannot last forever. Beijing needs to at least meet Taipei and the new political
realities halfway in an attempt to define a new, more stable formula for both its
relations with Taiwan and Washington. Furthermore, Chen Shuibian’s victory has
been the one outcome Beijing most loathed and had wanted to prevent. The PRC’s
message that ”a vote for Chen is a vote for war” will make it much more difficult in
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the future to seek and find a compromise with a DPP-based government. Although
Chen has proven his political farsightedness by ruling out holding a referendum on
independence in the near future, and in spite of his offer of new economic ties and
cooperation, Beijing and Jiang Zemin’s CPC can simply not trust him over the
longer term. And although Taiwan appears ready to enter into negotiations for
reunification, it is simply not interested in the kind of outcome that Beijing is
seeking. Therefore, negotiations will only transfer both sides’ mutually exclusive
interests to a higher political level without resolving them. Given Beijing’s self-
declared time-pressure to finalise those negotiations by 2007, inherent pressures and
conflicts can probably only increase. The next three to five years are thus predicted
by most US experts to become a period of heightened tensions and potential crisis.
Whether, as has been argued, there is a new Beijing ”timetable without time limit,”
70
 remains to be seen. However, as Bates Gill recently argued, any political strategy
for a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan issue must recognize the crucial importance
of the democratic evolution in Taiwan,: ”... acknowledging it, nurturing it, preserv-
ing it, and integrating its indisputable reality and dynamism into the ultimate
settlement of the cross-Straits quandary.”71
The South China Sea: Is a Regional Code of Conduct the Answer to Territorial
Claims and Conflicts?
”China’s claim to the South China Sea and its islets is so extreme that it is
sometimes difficult to take [it] seriously. But we in ASEAN should not
underestimate the firmness with which China is pursuing its designs on
the Spratlys. Nor should we underestimate the extent of domestic support
for Beijing’s chauvinistic foreign policy. We cannot discount the fact that
China’s increasing assertiveness in its foreign relations has wide support
inside the country. ...We need to speak to China with one voice in re-
gards to the South China Sea. China’s sweeping claim to the Spratlys is
not just about barren islets, some of which disappear at high tide. It is not
just about fishing rights, marine resources, or even the hydrocarbon re-
serves widely believed to lie under the shallow waters of the South China
Sea. It is about Southeast Asia’s security and survival...The South China
Sea ... flows into the most complex series of maritime crossroads in the
world. Just as the Mediterranean was the heartland of the classical civili-
zations of Southern Europe, West Asia, and North Africa, this great in-
land sea is Southeast Asia’s strategic heartland.”
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(General Jose T. Almonte, former National Security Adviser and Direc-
tor-General of the National Security Council of the Philippines, March
200072)
Conflict and Cooperation in the South China Sea in the 1990s: A ”Mare Sinica”?
Although ASEAN countries have increasingly arranged themselves with the PRC in
the post-Cold War period since 1992, the nature of ASEAN‘s relationship with
China has remained ambivalent73 and has had direct implications for ASEAN‘s
relations with the other two major powers in the Asia-Pacific, Japan and the United
States. Whereas ASEAN’s general engagement policies towards China have been
guided by the economic perspective of a huge Chinese market (in 1997, the World
Bank suggested that China‘s economy would overtake the US economy in terms of
total output and total purchasing power by 2020 74), Beijing’s ambiguous foreign
and security policies have at the same time presented a major concern for the region.
Rapid modernization of China‘s armed forces (including its nuclear arsenal),75
Beijing‘s territorial claims to almost the entire South China Sea, and its ”gunboat-
policies” towards Taiwan have raised widespread concern over irredentist tendencies
on China‘s foreign and security agenda. The PRC‘s policy of underpinning its
territorial claims with concrete political and military steps as well as the assertive
nature of its Taiwan policy that does not rule out the use of force for achieving
political objectives have alarmed even those segments of ASEAN’s political elites
that have always favoured close relations with China. At the same time, ASEAN
countries and China, due to a similar critical stage of political and socio-economic
transformation, have been competing in world markets over foreign trade and
investment.
Military modernisation programmes, the incorporation of high-tech weaponry,
and the emergence of indigenous defence industries over recent years notwithstan-
ding, Southeast Asian armed forces have only very limited power projection capabi-
lities. By contrast, China’s armed forces, due to the relative stability of the PRC
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economy, have so far not been subjected to major cuts. As a consequence, the pace
of China’s military reform and modernisation has contributed to regional percep-
tions of a looming Chinese threat that might become real much earlier than had
previously been assumed.76
From an ASEAN point of view, China’s sovereignty claims in the South China
Sea and the methods Beijing has been applying to pursue its strategic goals –
whether they be peaceful and benign or violent and assertive – are often being
interpreted as a litmus test for the Association‘s future relationship with China and
as a crucial factor for the preservation of regional stability in East Asia. Whereas
policies of ASEAN’s member states towards China have differed to some extent,
there is a general consensus that ASEAN solidarity would require common opposi-
tion to any use of force by the PRC.
China claims almost all islands in the South China Sea which would make the
”Middle Kingdom” a close neighbour of most regional states. These claims theoreti-
cally increase the PRC’s territorial sea and adjacent waters from 370,000 square kms
to approximately 3 million square kms. The PLA navy has already occupied the
more important outermost islets in the South China Sea as a means to substantiate
the claim.77 In this context, the most complex and potentially most dangerous
territorial dispute concerns the Paracel Islands to the north and the Spratly archipe-
lago in the middle of the South China Sea. The Paracel Islands alone comprise 130
barren islands. After seizing a part of the archipelago then occupied by South
Vietnam in 1974, the PLA constructed a 2,700-meter airstrip on Woody Island, from
which its aircraft can attack, and to some extent control, areas as far south as the
Spratlys. Since that time, China has rejected competing claims to the Paracels made
by Vietnam. The Spratlys are disputed by China (and Taiwan), Vietnam, the Philip-
pines, Malaysia, and Brunei. China (and Taiwan) as well as Vietnam claim the
whole archipelago, the Philippines claim a substantial portion, and Malaysia claims
a small sector towards the south.
During the 1995/96 Taiwan crisis, and unimpressed by the presence of two US
aircraft carrier battle groups, Beijing told the Seventh Fleet to keep out of the
Taiwan Strait, which is about 180 kilometers (115 miles) wide and separates Taiwan
from China’s Fujian Province. The PRC claims that the passage is part of its territo-
rial sea. Shortly after the crisis, on 15 May 1996, China issued a map which extends
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its territorial claims in the South China Sea by over a million square miles, i.e. an
expansion by seven times. Free passage through Sealanes of Communication
(SLOCs) such as the Taiwan Strait and shipping routes through the South China Sea
are important prerequisites for regional security that would have to be guaranteed by
the US Navy in times of crisis. Washington has warned China that it will not accept
any restrictions to the freedom of movement of American warships and military
aircraft in the South China Sea.78 Other regional players such as Japan also have a
strong interest in the stability of the area because of their sensitivity to any disrup-
tion of commercial navigation. Although Japan has renounced its claims to the
Spratly Islands79, it has vital security interests in open sealanes and thus in the status
quo, because about 75 percent of its energy imports and much of its merchant
shipping passes through the South China Sea. Moreover, the involvement of Japa-
nese oil companies in the Spratlys represents another Japanese security interest in
the stability of the South China Sea. But Japan is not the only non-ASEAN-country
that has a geostrategic interest in the freedom of SLOCs, given that 20 percent of the
world’s oil consumption and more than 200 ships transit the Malacca Straits on any
given day. In 1994, almost a trillion dollars worth of international trade, including
more than half of ASEAN‘s trade, used these sea lanes. Establishing sovereignty
over the Spratlys would involve some sort of, at least, indirect control over shipping
passing through the Malacca Straits.
According to the official PRC point of view as expressed in a 25 February 1992
”Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea”, and in striking
contrast with the stance adopted by other claimants, there is no dispute because the
respective islands have belonged to China for centuries. When passing the law,
China shocked both ASEAN and Japan by actually including the Senkaku Islands
and almost all elevations in the South China Sea into its territorial waters without
taking note of rival claims. The PRC has also stated that it would defend its claims
by military means as it did in 1988, when the PLA navy seized six Spratly islands
while sinking two Vietnamese military vessels. It was no coincidence that this new
assertiveness occured shortly after the US had announced its withdrawal from the
Philippines. This, in turn, compelled ASEAN to make an unprecedented statement
(the 1992 Manila Declaration on the South China Sea), urging the peaceful settle-
ment of conflicting territorial claims and the need to cooperate in order to ensure the
                                               
78 See Michael Richardson, IHT (19 September 1996), p. 4.
79 Japan had occupied the Spratly islands and reefs in 1939. The Japanese imperial navy used one
of the islands, Taiping Dao, as a submarine base in World War II. At the 1951 San Francisco
conference, Japan renounced all claims to the Spratlys, but the conference did not resolve the
problem of ownership. On direct and indirect Japanese interests at the Spratlys see Koichi Sato,
„The Japan Card.“, FEER (13 April 1995), p. 32.
24
safety of maritime navigation and communication as well as other forms of security
cooperation.80
Disregarding this appeal, China in early 1995 seized Mischief Reef about 150
miles west of the Philippine island of Palawan. Subsequently, relations between
Beijing and Manila deteriorated and tensions increased with the arrests of Chinese
fishermen and the destruction of Chinese markers by the Philippines navy. And
whereas Manila opted for negotiations on a basis of international law, China did not
consider itself bound by the Manila Declaration.
Beijing‘s ”historical claims” and its militaristic policy towards Taiwan have also
raised mistrust in Jakarta. Indonesia had usually tried to accommodate China, but a
PRC map published in 1993 showed claims that included its natural gas-rich Natuna
Islands. These islands are surrounded by one of the world‘s largest offshore gas
fields containing an estimated 1.27 trillion cubic metres of recoverable gas –
approximately 40 percent of Indonesia’s total gas reserves.81 Some Indonesian
security experts have since recommended adopting a ”more realistic” China policy
and getting tougher on Beijing. Jakarta subsequently declared its intention to
increase airforce patrols in the area and to encourage its citizens to resettle on the
Natuna Islands. Indonesia also quietly urged the US to strengthen its engagement in
the territorial dispute. In the summer of 1996, Jakarta launched its largest air, land,
and sea manoeuvres so far to demonstrate its determination  to defend its sove-
reignty of the islands.82 Proposed legistlation was to expand the country’s sove-
reignty to some 5.8 million square kilometers of water and land.83 At the same time,
a review of Indonesia‘s maritime security resulted in the creation of a National
Maritime Council charged with devising policies on preservation and protection of
the seas and the more than 17,000 Indonesian islands stretching along the Equator
for 5,120 kilometers.
Given that the Indonesian navy remains a coastal defence force, Jakarta also felt
compelled to widen and deepen its security and defence ties with Australia and the
US. Indonesia’s territorial waters were opened more widely for the passage of
foreign warships, including submarines.84 The bilateral security agreement with
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Australia signed in December 1995 marked a substantial step away from Jakarta’s
traditional policies of non-alignment with important impacts on other outstanding
security issues among both sides. Both countries were subsequently alleged to have
developed a strategy to defend the Natuna Islands against a whole range of possible
threats.85 Jakarta and Canberra also entered into negotiations on a maritime bounda-
ry treaty that would bring almost three decades of tension and mutual distrust to an
end.86 Adjustments made in Indonesia’s security policies over the last four years
thus have strategic dimensions, going beyond national security policy, that have a
considerable impact on ASEAN’s relations with China and the other major powers
in the region. Jakarta had obviously come to realise that ASEAN thinking on
security was not an adequate response to long-term challenges like those Indonesia
was facing in its maritime environment. China‘s sovereignty claim has ultimately
fastened the reconfiguration, in both conceptual and operational terms, of the
defence policies of Indonesia and other ASEAN states.87 Unfortunately, the Indone-
sian crisis and the East Timor problem have halted all efforts to redefine Indonesia’s
strategic interests vis-á-vis China and the South China Sea. Once again, domestic
stability understandably has become the major preoccupation and will continue to
dominate the national agenda over the next few years.
In January 1998, conclusion of a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the
US and construction of a new pier at Singapore, suitable for US aircraft carriers,
emphasized ASEAN’s strategic interest in a strong US military engagement in the
region.
China may still believe it is able to achieve its objectives over time without re-
sorting to massive confrontation with neighbouring claimant states. Beijing’s present
rather contradictory policies and actions in the South China Sea follow a traditional
”divide and conquer” strategy, and are fully in line with its strategic culture and
notions of war and diplomacy.88
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In early 1997, Beijing raised the stakes again by conducting an oil and gas explo-
ration drill off central Vietnam in waters claimed by Hanoi. Since the beginning of
the ”asymmetrical normalisation process” between Vietnam and China in 1991,
China has violated Vietnamese territorial waters at least nine times.89 But contrast-
ing with the years of Vietnam’s regional isolation, Chinese tactics this time backfi-
red. Vietnam received significant political and diplomatic support by its fellow
ASEAN members and even discussed a future military relationship with the US – a
nightmare for PRC strategists fearing US containment. According to a comment
made by an ASEAN-diplomat at the time: ”Automatically ASEAN will support
Vietnam. It’s all for one and one for all.”90 However, ASEAN countries sub-
sequently agreed to Beijing’s insistence on bilateral negotiations to solve territorial
disputes. On the other hand, they were rather suspicous as far as China’s offer for
”joint development” of disputed areas was concerned, viewing it ”less as a genui-
nely conciliatory suggestion and more as a Chinese ploy to gain a foothold in areas
claimed by the People’s Republic” as Tim Huxley has argued.91
Although ASEAN states often have tried to accomodate rather than confront
China’s strategic power, they interpreted the 1997 episode as another litmus test
compelling them to respond.92 Repeated calls on China to withdraw its oil explora-
tion vessel eventually led to a diplomatic defeat for Beijing that further damaged the
PRC‘s international image. But the incident also underlined the fragility of
ASEAN‘s ”constructive engagement” policy towards China,93 and it explains
Beijing‘s interest in addressing territorial disputes bilaterally rather than in a multi-
lateral framework. Parallel efforts made by the ARF to engage China particulary
over maritime issues also suffered a setback. Even the Philippines, militarily the
weakest ASEAN member and engaged in a dispute with China over the Spratly
Islands and Scarborough Shoal in the Macclesfield Bank, announced a comprehen-
sive military modernisation programme following several clashes with Chinese
vessels in early 1997.94 A PRC-sponsored „goodwill tour“ by a group of shortwave
radio amateurs to Scarborough Shoal provoked another conflict in the early summer
of 1997. The Chinese government had reportedly paid ”tens of thousands of dollars”
to charter the boat. From the Philippines‘ point of view, this appeared like a delibe-
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rate strategy of using non-military means to reinforce Beijing‘s territorial claims and
test Manila‘s political will.95
Whereas all claimants to territories in the South China Sea have stated their prefe-
rence for peaceful solutions and negotiations, China appears to have kept the
military option open. Arguments put forward by Western experts that occupied
islands can not be defended by the PLA presently96 overlook the fact that China is a
growing nuclear power and that ASEAN countries as well as Japan, Taiwan, and
others lack sufficient amphibious forces to recuperate occupied islands. Only the US
has sufficient and effective amphibious capacities to perform such a task in the
South China Sea. But making use of the military option would constitute  a high risk
game for Washington, too. Reliance on aircraft carriers and Aegis-equipped surface
escort ships, for instance, would be inadequate if not dangerous in littoral conflicts
in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea.97 Ultimately, what matters in this
respect are security perceptions and expectations rather than objective strengths and
weaknesses of claimant countries. Military history, including that of China, has
abundant examples of weaker forces defeating much stronger rivals. Circumstances,
motivation, and a superior strategy have often been more important than numbers.
Whether the US would want to incur such a risk for a few uninhabited islands in
the South China Sea is indeed the crucial question for ASEAN security experts.
Prior to the outbreak of East Asia’s financial crisis in 1997, ASEAN defence
policies and military doctrines were increasingly based on such a scenario which in
turn determined acquisitions of state-of-the-art weapons systems.98
Although China had verbally agreed not to change the status quo in the South
China Sea through unilateral steps and to seek a peaceful solution through negotiati-
ons, the PRC has continued to test the political will of Vietnam and the Philippines
as well as their support within ASEAN. In August 1995, Beijing and Manila agreed
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on a code of conduct to prevent any direct confrontation over the Spratly islands99
which was signed in November. 100 New multilateral security discussions and
confidence building measures initiated since 1994 in the framework of ARF and
CSCAP notwithstanding, China has not given up its claims to almost the entire
South China Sea.
Moreover, despite signs of solidarity emerging within ASEAN when China tested
its political will in 1995 and 1997, Beijing‘s efforts to pursue its strategy ”at limiting
alliances forming against it have been remarkably successful, particularly during the
period they needed this success most: in establishing a physical presence in the
Spratlys and gaining some recognition of the legitimacy of China’s sovereignty.”101
And indeed, China has rather successfully frustrated the attempts made by some
ASEAN countries to internationalise the dispute, insisting on exclusively bilateral
negotiations which provide the PRC with considerable strategic leeway vis-à-vis its
much weaker opponents.
Escalating Conflict between China and the Philippines since 1998 and the Perspec-
tives for a Regional Code of Conduct for Crisis Management and Conflict Preven-
tion
China’s more recent policies in the South China Sea have confirmed the assumption
that the PRC follows a dual track strategy of, on the one hand, ”creeping occupa-
tion” to create faits accomplis in the South China Sea and, on the other, diplomatic
appeasement vis-à-vis ASEAN. In mid-April 1998, three Chinese ships provoca-
tively anchored in the vicinity of a Vietnamese-garrisoned area of the Spratlys. In
August 1998, the Philippine Air Force discovered four Chinese ships anchored near
the Philippine-claimed Scarborough Shoal. This prompted a rapid response by US
Navy and Philippine naval vessels in the guise of a live firing exercise in the vicinity
of the shoal.102 Finally, on 28 October 1998, aerial reconaissance by the Philippine
Air Force have showed that China had recently completed new hardened structures
on Mischief Reef, which is much closer to the Philippines than it is to China. These
structures included fortified three storey-buildings, a new pier, an observation post, a
military command centre, gun emplacements, and radar facilities at four different
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sites. A helipad was still under construction. The reef was guarded by Chinese naval
ships and anti-aircraft artillery. The new facilities looked like fortifications, similar
to, but bigger than those China already had on Chigua and Fiery Cross reefs.103
According to most other Northeast and Southeast Asian states, this represented a
clear violation of the previously agreed-to preservation of the status quo. Beijing‘s
irresponsible and intimidating action has thus further undermined ASEAN’s propo-
sals for confidence building and regional security in the frameworks of ARF and
CSCAP activities.
In response, the Philippine armed forces, comprising the weakest navy and air
force in Southeast Asia, was ordered by President Joseph Estrada to boost its
presence in the area with the deployment of additional vessels and reconnaissance
aircraft. A major deployment of Philippine marines to Palawan and the Spratlys was
reportedly under preparation.104 Moreover, the Philippines navy detained 20 Chinese
fishermen in the vicinity of Mischief Reef. Thereupon, Beijing warned Manila not to
escalate the existing state of tension and to release the fishermen and six impounded
vessels. On the occasion, the PRC reaffirmed its ”indisputable sovereignty over the
islands and the seas around them.”105 Unable to confront China militarily and to
make any difference except by continuing to talk with the Chinese side and trying to
get international public opinion behind it, Estrada pushed the January 1998 VFA
with the US through ratification. The agreement provides for joint large-scale
exercises between US and Philippine forces on Philippine soil and in the region.106
Although China subsequently promised not to build any new structures in the
Spratly islands, more renovation work as the Chinese side called it cannot be ruled
out in the light of previous experiences. Although China has repeatedly offered
”joint development, including fisheries development and exploitation on an equal
sharing basis,”107 realisation of such proposals remains dependent upon the readiness
of the Philippine side to accept China’s territorial sovereignty over the Spratly
Islands. In the meantime, other regional countries have practised resource sharing in
areas of overlapping claims to their mutual benefit.
Even more important for Beijing’s strategy of ”calculated ambiguity” was the
timing of China’s renewed aggressiveness.108 Already in the past, China had consis-
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tently moved to reinforce its maritime claims towards others at times when the latter
were weakened. Many regional observers have interpreted this behaviour as another
indicator for the extent to which the balance of power and influence has shifted in
China’s favour since the onset of the region’s economic crisis which weakened
ASEAN economically, militarily, and politically. Furthermore, construction activi-
ties on Mischief Reef were resumed shortly before the annual APEC conference on
17 November 1998, during which China pledged funding for ailing Asian econo-
mies, and ASEAN‘s December summit in Hanoi. Therefore, and with public
attention focused on the severe socio-economic and political crisis at home, the
Philippines, unlike in 1995 and 1997, this time were unable to mobilise strong
political support of its ASEAN partners. Once again, China’s provocative policy in
the Spratly Islands thus revealed the increasingly asymmetric power relations
between China and the five other claimant states. Contrasting with the Dia-
oyu(tai)/Senkaku Islands dispute with Japan, rival claimants to the Spratly Islands
have much less economic leverage over China that could constrain Beijing’s
assertive policies of ”creeping occupation”. The result has been opportunistic and
sometimes aggressive Chinese behaviour,109 a pattern that reemerged in early 1998
when China built satellite relais stations on a group of islands over which Vietnam
also claims sovereignty.110
Decreasing ASEAN solidarity could even more than China’s provocative behavi-
our have significant long-term security implications for the Association and regional
stability. Kowtowing to China’s increasing assertiveness risks encouraging more
dangerous behaviour. Revealing a striking lack of strategic understanding,
ASEAN’s Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino stated in late 1998: ”We have bigger
problems to deal with, particularly the economy.”111 As Ralph A. Cossa has con-
cluded: ”The message to China is that further expansion will not be seriously
protested, much less contested. This is a recipe for potential disaster.”112 Indeed, in a
context of ”crisis management” and ”preventive diplomacy”, ASEAN’s failure to
confront China might could increase rather than decrease prospects for further
miscalculation on both sides. In this regard, China’s ongoing provocative behaviour
and future Philippine or Vietnamese counter- and overreactions constitute an
”accident waiting to happen” that might trigger an otherwise unintended escalation.
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This trend is further reinforced by increases in competing commercial and military
activities and the easy availability of new military hardware, as well as China‘s lack
of recognition of the risks resulting from a unilateral ”creeping occupation” that
changes the status quo in the region. An unexplained 1996 clash between the
Philippines navy and suspected Chinese gunboats 120 kms northwest of Manila, for
instance, is just one example of such inadvertent naval confrontations.113
In this context, it is important to understand that it is not only the Chinese notion
of territorial sovereignty that appears outdated in an era of globalisation. Even
political reformers and dissidents have defended China’s ”national interest” in the
South China Sea and its territorial claims as a ”sacred duty.”114 In their view,
China’s territorial claims are basically ”non-negotiable” and the use of force as an
instrument of foreign policy and tool of coercion to achieve political objectives in
the South China Sea cannot be excluded.115 A the same time, Beijing remains
opposed to submitting any claims to the International Court of Justice or the Inter-
national Tribunal for the Law of the Sea as demanded by the Philippines and other
ASEAN countries.116
For the Philippines, it is even more discomforting that ASEAN partners such as
Malaysia and Vietnam have been following unilateral strategies which risk under-
mining ASEAN’s political cohesion. Malaysia’s recently built infrastructure, for
instance, for the purpose of ”scientific studies on fisheries and the deep sea” on the
Investigator (Peninjau) and Erica (Sipit) reefs in the Spratly island chain, which are
equipped with a radar antenna and a helicopter landing pad, has provoked strong
protests in both Beijing and Manila and has thus further underminded a common
ASEAN position vis-à-vis China. Taiwan, by contrast, in November 1999 said it
would exchange its marines on the Pratas (Tungsha) and Spratly (Nansha) islands as
well as on two other major front-line islands groups in the Taiwan Strait (Kinmen
and Matsu) for coast guards.117 In February 2000, the actual control of Pratas and
Taiping was shifted from the defence ministry to the Coast Guard Administration
(CGA). At the same time, however, Taiwan adopted comprehensive measures –
including implementation of an ”Ocean Policy White Paper” and construction of
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harbours on the abovementioned islands – to consolidate its legal claims. Taipei is
also considering opening up Pratas to tourism and to contract passenger shipping
corporations for the transportat and accomodation of tourists.118
Feeling betrayed by China and by its own ASEAN partners,119 the Philippines
saw no other alternative than strengthening their defence cooperation with the US
and resumed large-scale joint military exercises with Washington.120 In the mean-
time, President Estrada sought the help of Filipino-Chinese businessmen to find a
modus vivendi with China and even suggested holding sports competitions among
all claimants on one of the Spratly Islands, but this ”soccer diplomacy” and bilateral
contacts with China only resulted in a ”dialogue of the deaf”. On the one hand,
Beijing in 1999 repeatedly promised self-restraint, on the other, the PRC repeatedly
rejected Philippine demands for a commitment not to build new structures. Beijing
also refused to tear down the newly-built infrastructure on Mischief Reef.
Meanwhile, the Philippine’s 15-year military modernisation programme remains
a subject of ongoing dispute due to a lack of funds and complex bureaucratic
procedures. President Estrada has relaunched the programme with an initial invest-
ment of only six billion pesos (US$ 157.9 million). Nonetheless, Manila is conside-
ring acquiring Perry-class and Knox-class frigates in the framework of transfers on a
grant basis of excess military equipment from the US. The frigates in question
would be the largest ships ever deployed by the Philippines navy.121
In 1999, the conflict between the Philippines and China escalated further when
the Philippines navy sunk two Chinese fishing boats in May and June, respectively,
after having fired warning shots and chased the intruders.122 Officially, both events
were described as ”accidents” in Manila. Following strong protest from Beijing, the
Philippine government promised to review the procedures for patrolling disputed
areas in the South China Sea so as to prevent further sinkings of foreign ships. At
the same time, however, Manila indicated its readiness to follow the examples of
China and Malaysia by reinforcing its own infrastructure in the seven islands it has
occupied in the Spratlys.123 On May 9, a Philippine naval ship was grounded on a
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reef near Second Thomas Shoal. When two Chinese frigates approached the Philip-
pine vessel six days later, instead of offering any assistance, they allegedly tried out
their guns in a perceived ”hostile act.”124 At that time, President Estrada had already
canceled a visit to Beijing scheduled for May.
In October 1999, Vietnamese troops on a Spratlys shoal claimed by Manila fired
warning shots at a Philippine Air Force reconnaissance plane.125 When another
Philippine naval ship ran aground on November 3, China reportedly became suspi-
cious and considered the possibility of these groundings being a new tactic designed
to advance Philippines’ claims in the disputed area.126
China has mostly succeeded isolating the Philippines by cultivating closer eco-
nomic and political relations with other ASEAN countries. But since summer 1999,
the Philippines and other ASEAN states have tried to manage territorial conflicts in
the South China by drafting an ASEAN code of conduct as a CBM and by exercis-
ing ”self-restraint and refrain from unilateral actions” that might increase tensions.
Manila had hoped that the code would deter China from building more structures in
other parts of the disputed island chain. Even more important was the expectation
that the code of conduct would restore ASEAN unity in dealing with sovereignty
and maritime disputes in the South China Sea, thus strengthing ASEAN’s collective
leverage to constrain China’s ”creeping assertiveness” in the area. During the first
half of 1999, the idea was discussed and endorsed in both ”track one” (ASEAN
summit, AMM and ARF) as well as ”track two” (CSCAP, Workshop on Managing
Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea) meetings. In August 1999, the Philip-
pines presented a draft code on behalf of ASEAN; Beijing came out with its own
version in October. Both drafts were discussed at the ASEAN-China meeting held in
Manila in November 1999. On that occasion, the PRC refused to consider the
Phlippines draft but agreed to hold further discussions. Unlike the ASEAN docu-
ment, the Chinese version did not contain an appeal to claimants to refrain from
settling or erecting structures on presently uninhabitated islands, reefs, shoals, cays,
and other features in the disputed area. Both China and Malaysia then tried to delay
procedures by arguing against a ”hasty drafting” of the document and by insisting
that they required a bilateral code of conduct.127 Moreover, the PRC has made its
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signature contingent on the acceptance of three proposed CBMs: (1) notification of
any joint military exercises held in disputed areas (where Beijing does not risk
having to reciprocate), (2) attendance by Chinese officials as observers at joint
exercises, and (3) humane treatment for arrested fishermen. Ultimately, however,
China is determined to see an end to any joint military exercises and military
operations around the Spratly Islands and thus to prevent any US interference in this
or other bilateral conflicts in the region.128 Furthermore, Taiwan as one of the
claimants and an important financial contributor to many cooperative projects,
following PRC pressure, has not been invited to participate in the formulation of the
code of conduct. This omission is shortsighted and counterproductive for all other
claimant states, because it leaves Taipei with ‚much room for maneuvering in its
future activies in the South China Sea.‘129
In the meantime, ASEAN agreed to two major revisions to the Philippine draft.
First, the definition of disputed areas was adjusted to comprise of both the Spratlys
and the Paracel Islands, as Hanoi‘s dispute with China covered both archipelagoes.
China, by contrast insists that the code should be applied only to the Spratly Islands.
Secondly, exploration and exploitation of resources in disputed areas was dele-
tedfrom the list of potential areas of cooperation.130 It is not only China, but also
Vietnam and the Philippines who remain reluctant to enter into any joint develop-
ment projects before territorial disputes are resolved. In the meantime, more discus-
sion is required to finalize the text. Once adopted, such a code could help to build
trust, enhance cooperation, and reduce tension in the Spratlys. However, it would be
naive and unrealistic to believe that it would contribute to resolving territorial
disputes in the South China Sea. In the past, China has signed bilateral codes of
conduct with the Philippines (August 1995) and Vietnam (November 1995), without
abiding by the very principles spelled out in these agreements. Neither the above-
mentioned codes nor Beijing’s signing of the UN Charter of the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) in April 1996 have deterred the PRC from extending the structures it
had previously built on disputed islands in the South China Sea. Furthermore,
agreements such as the newly-proposed regional code of conduct are declarations of
intent rather than legally binding instruments.
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As long as ASEAN shies away from collectively confronting China as had been
the case in 1995 and 1997, Beijing will hardly feel prompted to halt its ”creeping
assertiveness” in the South China Sea.131 Significantly, the PRC has also offered to
sign the protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone Treaty
(SEANWFZ) – provided that it does not cover Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs)
and continental shelves in the Asia-Pacific region.
During the first months of 2000, the situation has not improved significantly.
Chinese fishing vessels are still fishing in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal, and
Chinese aircraft have been spotted flying over the Philippines‘ territorial waters.
This has resulted in new Philippine attempts to force PRC fishing boats to leave and
in new diplomatic protest by Manila.132
Against this background, the US attempt to stay neutral for as long as the freedom
of navigation is guaranteed and SLOCs remain open and to otherwise adhere to an
excessively legalistic interpretation has provided China with opportunities to
skillfully advance its ”creeping assertiveness” by playing on legal ambiguities
reinforced by US policies. In the meantime, certain experts and policy circles in
Washington have become more concerned about the present situation.133 Obviously,
future US policies towards the South China Sea remain critical for stability in the
entire Southeast Asian region.
Perspectives of the Asia-Pacific Region: A Shifting Balance of Power? – Impli-
cations for Regional Stability and the Role of Europe
Despite the fact that the US has retained 100,000 troops in the Asia-Pacific region as
evidence of its commitment, human right concerns, a new ”donorgate” scandal, and
other domestic issues, as well as concerted Western policies devised to punish
Burma, in late 1997 seemed to have driven Southeast Asian countries closer to
China and Japan.134 Washington’s rather muted response to the regional economic
crisis had added to old suspicions and fuelled conspiracy theories and anti-American
sentiment. It was particularly the slow speed of the US response to the crisis (which
had far-reaching impacts on Southeast Asian domestic and foreign policies, as well
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as the political stability of Indonesia and relations among ASEAN members) that
made it possible for China to strengthen its influence at the expense of the US and as
a counterweight to the US-Japan alliance. Compared with other regional players, the
PRC in 1997/98 appeared to be relatively stable in both political and economic
terms. Moreover, Beijing had launched a diplomatic campaign to fashion a modern
version of the Middle Kingdom in the region. This included a US$ 1 billion contri-
bution to the IMF‘s rescue packages for Thailand and Indonesia.135 It looked as
though the balance of political influence had increasingly tipped in favour of China
which was trying to capitalize on ASEAN’s weakness and Japan’s lack of leadership
as well as its inability to abandon its ”virtual crisis response policies.”136
At the beginning of the crisis, Japan had appeared to be a more promising eco-
nomic ally. Later, however, and a US$ 30 billion rescue plan for Southeast Asia
notwithstanding, Tokyo’s bureaucratic and political elites showed serious weaknes-
ses in dealing with their own homemade crisis.137 Given the lack of Japanese
leadership and Washington‘s initially slow response to the financial and economic
crisis as well as its inability to communicate without raising suspicions, it looked as
though economic woes were compelling Asia-Pacific countries to forge closer
relations with China. One indicator for such a strategic shift was the so-called
”imperial intrigue” between Malaysia‘s Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed and
China’s Premier Li Peng that transpired on the occasion of the first annual East
Asian (ASEAN-plus-three) summit meeting in December 1997. Furthermore, from
an American point of view, China and ASEAN were trying to foster a sense of unity
by excluding the US.138
In reality, however, neither Japan nor China have replaced the US as a stabilising
force, principal balancer, and ”benign hegemon” in the region, nor will they do so in
the foreseeable future. China certainly has the political will to take over this role, but
it still lacks the economic power to assume Japan’s role as an economic leader. The
Japanese economy is six times that of China and accounts for more than 70 percent
of total East Asian economic output and purchasing power. Moreover, Tokyo
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contributed US$ 80 billion altogether towards coping with the Asian financial crisis,
whereas Beijing provided only 1 billion.139 Meanwhile, the PRC itself has been
infected by the regional crisis, albeit in rather different ways. China is confronted
with a looming financial and banking crisis and a potentially more severe socio-
economic destabilisation cum political crisis in the mid-term perspective. Over the
next few years, Beijing will be confronted with unprecedented socio-economic
challenges that could severely impact on the stability of the PRC‘s political system
(i.e. widespread corruption or the spread of religion-based movements such as Falun
Gong or Zhong Gong). China is also suffering from widespread unemployment with
100-130 million people (about the size of the population of Japan) which is bound to
further increase. Whereas corruption has become endemic, economic progress has
been increasingly uneven among southeastern coastal provinces on the one hand and
interior rural areas on the other. Combined with recent protectionist trends, slower
growth in export markets, lower product prices, and increasing competition from
Latin America, pressures to devaluate the renminbi and to subsidise exports could
increase, a development that can ultimately threaten China‘s WTO accession.140 It
could also result in Chinese attempts to wrest market shares from its Southeast
Asian neighbours, which in turn would lead to new economic and political conflict
between Beijing and ASEAN. At the same time, China’s self-image as an
”unsatisfied power” provides a striking contrast with the economic and military
realities of an ”incomplete great power.”141 Some Chinese economists have already
concluded that ”China has turned from a regional stabilizer to a regional risk
factor.”142 But regional foreign policies are considerably driven by perceptions. And
here one can identify a perceptional gap existing in East Asia between the objective
assessment of China’s political, economic, and military prowess on the one hand and
perceptions of a PRC rising to dominant power status on the other. Even those Asian
experts who have concluded that the US rather than China is the political ”winner”
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of the present East Asian financial and economic crisis ask for how long that state of
affairs can be maintained before Beijing replaces Washington.
And yet, criticism directed at the US and the West in general by some ASEAN
countries after the outbreak of crisis in the summer of 1997 was often very ambiva-
lent and unconvincing. When outside help was offered, it was initially turned down
because it did not represent an ”Asian solution to Asian problems”. As Gerald Segal
has critically concluded: ‚Many of the Southeast Asians who used to deride the
Americans and Europeans as powers in decline now complain that Westerners are
not doing enough to assist them. ... The moaners in Southeast Asia are the most
infuriating – the biggest free-riders on American deterrence of China and defence of
the global economy, and yet the quickest to carp.‘143
Furthermore, as Malaysian security expert Joon Num Mak reminded the regional
players, ‚the „ASEAN way“ was effective in managing sub-regional tensions only
because there was a security umbrella provided by the USA which look after the
main external threats to the region.‘144 The criticism made by some of the ASEAN
states thus provided a striking contrast to the central economic and political role the
US played in the framework of international organisations for working out specific
rescue plans. Furthermore, in the security field, the US as a ”status quo power” had
expanded its military-to-military cooperation not only with Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan but also with ASEAN countries such as Singapore, Thailand, and the
Philippines. Maintaining the forward presence of the US armed forces in the Asia-
Pacific has been facilitated by activities such as port calls, repair, joint training, and
logistical support.145 In sum, Southeast Asia’s economic, political, and military-
strategic dependence on the US has increased rather than declined as a result of the
multiple crises affecting the region.
While ASEAN has been very successful in developing informal approaches of
cooperation and in avoiding conflict, it has also been able to increase its political
and economic leverage over the last ten years despite its inherent diversity and due
to its remarkable economic growth and its increasing intra-political and economic
cooperation. Nonetheless, external factors will continue to considerably influence
the stability and future prosperity of ASEAN states. Therefore, the amount of
leverage the ASEAN countries have to enable them to organize a peaceful transition
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within member countries and the entire region also depends on the preservation of
stable and peaceful relations between the US, China, and Japan. However, both the
crisis and ASEAN’s inability to build an alliance to defend members‘ territorial
claims against China have undermined the political cohesion of the Association and
thus weakened its leverage vis-à-vis Beijing.
Some sympathy with China’s opposition to US pressure notwithstanding,
ASEAN has always been careful not to openly side with the PRC in calling for a
withdrawal of US forces from East Asia. If it agrees with China’s project to build a
multipolar world, then it is for different reasons. Several ASEAN countries have
held joint exercises with the US and have allowed the 7th Fleet to use their repair and
other facilities. Bilateral defence arrangements of individual ASEAN members with
external powers such as the UK, Australia, and the US have been strengthened in
recent years because of perceived Chinese hegemonial ambitions. However, each
ASEAN country takes a differrent attitude towards China’s attempts to assume a
dominant or hegemonial role. Moreover, important as ASEAN’s ”constructive
engagement” policies towards China may be, the development of Beijing’s policies
in the region primarily depend on the evolution of PRC domestic politics, over
which China’s neighbours have little or no direct influence.
Whereas China is being perceived by all ASEAN countries – albeit to different
extents – as the major potential long-term threat to regional stability, Japan is being
viewed in more positive terms at least for as long as Tokyo does not totally domi-
nate regional economies, accepts partners as equals, and does not unilaterally extend
its military role to Southeast Asia. Also whereas the PRC‘s power has been growing
and ASEAN has occasionally made us of Japan as a countervailing power to China’s
military might, Tokyo itself has been eager to enhance cooperation and dialogue
with ASEAN. However, Members‘ cautious response to the 1997 ”Hashimoto-
doctrine” indicated that a more prominent Japanese role in the security of the region
would be the result of domestic developments and US support rather than of attitu-
des taken by neighbouring countries. Given Japan’s domestic and external
constraints to assume such a role anytime soon, Tokyo‘s political options as a
”constrained power” in dealing with volatile and politically charged challenges
remain limited by a combination of domestic and external factors. Therefore,
Japan’s government would require a strong political will to accept new security
obligations and to initiate a broader and open security debate with its own public so
as to give new directions to its foreign and security policies. As has been the case
with ASEAN’s relation with China, the relationships and attitudes of ASEAN
members vis-à-vis Japan have differed somewhat, including specifically the question
whether and to what extent Tokyo should shoulder more regional and international
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obligations in the field of security. Although there is recognition in ASEAN of
Japan’s important contribution to the region’s economic growth and political
stability, views of a larger Japanese political and security role remain largely
ambivalent.
Nonetheless, by its own standards, Japan is in the midst of a ”revolution” in terms
of its future regional security and defence policies. In February 2000, the Japanese
foreign ministry announced that Tokyo would be willing to contribute armed
coastguard vessels to multinational anti-piracy patrols in the Malacca Straits.146
Japan has thus interpreted its constitutional notion of ”self-defence” as including
waters more than 2,000 miles away from Tokyo. The steady extension of the
defence perimeter mirrors the strategic importance of SLOCs and the South China
Sea for the economic survival of Japan as well as the increasing strategic and
geopolitical rivalry with China in East Asia and beyond. The October 1999 hi-
jacking of a large Japanese vessel by pirates and increasing economic and political
instability in Indonesia have underscored the need for outside assistance to cope
with the threat of piracy in the region. To counter historical anti-Japanese sentiments
and mistrust in Southeast Asia, Japan will dispatch less-conspicuous, civilian-
controlled coastguard vessels of its Maritime Safety Agency instead of regular
military vessels of its Self-Defence Forces. Contrasting with past practice, several
Southeast Asian governments have accepted the offer, thus also signalling a concern
with maintaining the regional balance of powers. India, too, appears determined to
counterbalance China‘s increasing influence and has established an informal but
deepening security-cooperation with Japan and Vietnam.147
Tokyo‘s ongoing search for a future role in the region, presently reflected in an
unprecedented debate over the possible revision of the anti-militaristic and pacifistic
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution,148 is a sign that Japan has been slowly coming
to grips with a reality it used to deny: ”It (Japan) is a great power with strategic
interests as pressing as its economic ones.”149
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Given lingering mistrust in the region as well as fears that a more proactive Japa-
nese role could complicate ASEAN’s relations with China, Tokyo can only assume
more responsibility by maintaining its alliance with Washington and abstaining from
unilateral approaches. Even then, Japan‘s role will increase and evolve only gradu-
ally and incrementally. Nonetheless, Japanese experts have indicated that possible
future security assistance might include the transfer to ASEAN countries of military
equipment and technologies, as well as the training of ASEAN military personnel
and development of close bi- and multilateral security consultations,150 projects that
are not altogether new.
Against this background, and given China’s suspicion of a redefined US-Japan
alliance, Washington and Tokyo need to demonstrate that their pact aims to preserve
regional peace and stability rather than contain the PRC. In this respect, and consi-
dering Japan’s repeated efforts to involve Beijing in closer bi- and multilateral
security dialogues, ASEAN can play a useful role in reassuring China that the re-
definition of the alliance is in the interest of the entire region and not specifically
directed against China. Beijing, in turn, has to recognise that disputes with Taiwan
are an internal matter only as long as they do not turn violent and affect the security
interests of other neighbouring countries.
Ultimately, however, regional stability will depend on a strong and sustained US
engagement, including the maintenance of substantial political, economic, and
military means as well as stability in the Japan-China-US triangle at a a time when
all three operate from positions of relative strength. China’s future internal stability
and the direction of its foreign policies as well as ASEAN‘s political coherence
(particularly following admission of Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia) will largely
determine to what extent the Association will be able to raise its voice in the region
and on the global level. The more China follows an assertive or even aggressive
policy as it has in the South China Sea, the more ASEAN’s relations with third
parties, namely the US and Japan, will again assume a greater importance. And the
more ASEAN becomes dependent on these two powers, the more it will ultimately
obstruct or reduce its own independent influence in the region and beyond. In such
circumstances, the Japan-China-US triangle would acquire even greater importance
for the stability of the entire Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, Washington‘s bilateral
alliances, supplemented by multilateral security structures such as ARF, CSCAP,
and other ”track-two” activities, will remain the bedrock of regional stability,
particularly so during times of socio-economic and political transition and the rise of
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China to a potentially unprecedented economic, political, and military power in the
region.151 In this context, the US-Japan alliance will remain the linchpin of
ASEAN’s stability; Japan’s security in general; and preservation, for the time being,
of Japan’s, South Korea’s and Taiwan’s non-nuclear weapon status.152
Against this background, Europe should ask herself whether it makes sense to
continue a traditional foreign policy vis-à-vis the Asia-Pacific region that is almost
exclusively defined by economic interests. This would run counter to the EU‘s
”Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)” and strategic security interests in
the region and worldwide. In this context, Europe still has to recognize that instabi-
lity or armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, in the Taiwan Strait, and in the South
China Sea will both directly and indirectly affect European and global security and
stability. Therefore, it is time to define Europe’s strategic and security interests in
the region as going beyond the present limited functional involvement in support of
KEDO and multilateral ”track one” and ”track two” security meetings such as ARF
and CSCAP.
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